RESUMEN El Servicio de Extensión Bibliotecaria es el medio adecuado que tiene la biblioteca para expandirse hacia la comunidad, de esa forma permite que aquellos usuarios que no la visitan hagan uso de sus servicios y documentos. Sin embargo, pocos conocen su historia y evolución a través del tiempo. Se muestra una revisión bibliográfica y el estado actual de este servicio. Los elementos incluidos en esta recolección abarcan publicaciones periódicas, sitios web, revistas electrónicas, publicados entre el siglo XVIII y el (...) presente. El documento pretende brindar una aproximación histórica al servicio de extensión bibliotecaria en las bibliotecas. ABSTRACT The Library Extension Service is the appropriate method a library has to expand into the community in a way that users who don’t visit it use its services and documents. However, just a few people know its history and development through time. A bibliographic review is shown along with the current state of this service. The elements included in it cover regular publications, web sites and electronic journals published from the XVIII century to the present time. The paper expects to provide a historical approach to the library extension service in libraries. (shrink)

In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...) be identified with an infinite sequence of consequence relations holding between increasingly complex relata: formulae, inferences, metainferences, and so on. As a result, the present proposal allows not only to differentiate Classical Logic from ST, but also from other systems sharing with it their valid metainferences. Finally, we show how these results have interesting consequences for some topics in the philosophical logic literature, among them for the debate around Logical Pluralism. The reason being that the discussion concerning this topic is usually carried out employing a rivalry criterion for logics that will need to be modified in light of the present investigation, according to which two logics can be non-identical even if they share the same valid inferences. (shrink)

In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut (...) involving semantic notions. In this article we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have nontrivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this article is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this article, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be nontrivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...) alternative of our own. After that, we consider a number of objections to our account and evaluate a substantially different approach to the same problem. (shrink)

When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...) sense, non-identical to it. We argue that this phenomenon can be generalized, given the existence of logics which coincide with Classical Logic regarding a number of metainferential levels—although they are, again, clearly different systems. We claim this highlights the need to arrive at a more refined version of the Collapse Argument, which we discuss at the end of the paper. (shrink)

A inteligência artificial invadiu as áreas da vida e visa reconfigurar a própria vida, com impactos nos direitos humanos. Estas repercussões no desenvolvimento humano têm tanto detractores como defensores. O artigo tem como objetivo estabelecer implicações bioéticas e psicopolíticas da inteligência artificial para os direitos humanos. O artigo foi elaborado sob o modelo PRISMA e utilizou a hermenêutica analógica para interpretação dos textos. Os resultados indicam benefícios, ameaças e oportunidades para as liberdades fundamentais e os direitos à equidade, identidade, autodeterminação, (...) autonomia, privacidade e bem-estar. As conclusões referem-se à integração de dispositivos, dados e algoritmos, que impactam os direitos humanos e suscitam a necessidade de refletir sobre a sua recriação, reformulação ou reconfiguração. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that classical logic is trivialized in the presence of a transparent truth-predicate. In this paper, we will explain why this point of view must be given up. The hierarchy of metainferential logics defined in Barrio et al. and Pailos recovers classical logic, either in the sense that every classical inferential validity is valid at some point in the hierarchy ), or because a logic of a transfinite level defined in terms of the hierarchy shares its validities (...) with classical logic. Each of these logics is consistent with transparent truth—as is shown in Pailos —, and this suggests that, contrary to standard opinions, transparent truth is after all consistent with classical logic. However, Scambler presents a major challenge to this approach. He argues that this hierarchy cannot be identified with classical logic in any way, because it recovers no classical antivalidities. We embrace Scambler’s challenge and develop a new logic based on these hierarchies. This logic recovers both every classical validity and every classical antivalidity. Moreover, we will follow the same strategy and show that contingencies need also be taken into account, and that none of the logics so far presented is enough to capture classical contingencies. Then, we will develop a multi-standard approach to elaborate a new logic that captures not only every classical validity, but also every classical antivalidity and contingency. As a€truth-predicate can be added to this logic, this result can be interpreted as showing that, despite the claims that are extremely widely accepted, classical logic does not trivialize in the context of transparent truth. (shrink)

La tesis de este artículo es que el mal banal se refiere a una conciencia deformada. Las obras de la misma Arendt dan lugar a una comprensión así del mal banal. Aunque distintos autores han subrayado la importancia de la conciencia en la formación de la banalidad del mal, ninguno ha optado por definirla de esta manera hasta donde se ve. Tampoco lo hizo Arendt, según se sabe. La filósofa alemana liga pensamiento y conciencia; entiende a esta como un subproducto (...) de aquel. Por eso no puede abandonarse la otra definición del mal banal, aquella que lo relaciona con la incapacidad para pensar. Arendt privilegia esta definición y no concluye la otra. Sin embargo, el pensamiento, tal como lo entiende Arendt, en su función de apartar al hombre del mal y juzgar los hechos de la experiencia, viene a semejarse a la conciencia, ya que esta tiene también este cometido. Además, la conciencia opera de manera dialógica, al modo como Arendt plantea que lo hace el pensar. Arendt no aclara cómo el pensar conduce al hombre a la verdad moral sobre sus actos, ni cómo aquel puede desvirtuarse. Tampoco indaga a profundidad en la conciencia. Todo esto ha motivado que se la interprete desde santo Tomás, en quien pueden hallarse algunos aportes claves para resolver algunas preguntas que Arendt dejó abiertas sobre el mal banal. (shrink)

Jaspers, using Weber as a model, makes a negative critique of Phenomenology, Neo-Kantism and modern Human Sciences, althoug he admires the discipline and clarity of thought of the two first philosophic movements.

In this paper, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and (...) complete three-sided sequent calculus for this expressively rich theory. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the “Standard View” of the semantics of ‘I’—according to which ‘I’ is a pure, automatic indexical—from a challenge posed by “deferred reference” cases, in which occurrences of ‘I’ are (allegedly) not speaker-referential, and thus non-automatic. In reply, I offer an alternative account of the cases in question, which I call the “Description Analysis” (DA). According to DA, seemingly deferred-referential occurrences of the first person pronoun are interpreted as constituents of a definite description, whose operator scopes (...) over an open sentence Rxy—where R is a contextually selected relation ranging over pairs of people and objects. The role of intentions is thus limited to the determination of R, which is posterior to the fixation of the reference of ‘I’. In support of the DA I present evidence that, in the cases in question, the (Determiner) phrase containing ‘I’ behaves in relevant ways like a description. I show that the DA can account for the problematic examples, while preserving the simplicity of the standard semantics of ‘I’. Finally, I examine a rival account of the data, offered by Nunberg (Linguist Philos 16:1–43, 1993), and argue for the superiority of the DA. (shrink)

Rejecting the Cut rule has been proposed as a strategy to avoid both the usual semantic paradoxes and the so-called v-Curry paradox. In this paper we consider if a Cut-free theory is capable of accurately representing its own notion of validity. We claim that the standard rules governing the validity predicate are too weak for this purpose and we show that although it is possible to strengthen these rules, the most obvious way of doing so brings with it a serious (...) problem: an internalized version of Cut can be proved for a Curry-like sentence. We also evaluate a number of possible ways of escaping this difficulty. (shrink)

I review and challenge the views on simplicity and its role in linguistics put forward by Ludlow. In particular, I criticize the claim that simplicity—in the sense pertinent to science—is nothing more than ease of use or “user-friendliness”, motivated by economy of labor. I argue that Ludlow’s discussion fails to do justice to the diversity of factors that are relevant to simplicity considerations. This, in turn, leads to the neglect of crucial cases in which the rationale for simplification is unmistakably (...) epistemic, as well as instances where simplicity is part of the content of substantive, empirical hypotheses. I illustrate these points with examples from the history of generative linguistics, such as: the shaping influence exerted by simplicity, via its involvement in the notion of “linguistically significant generalization”, its methodological and substantive contribution to the goal of explanatory adequacy, and its central role in the Minimalist Program’s search “beyond explanatory adequacy”. (shrink)

There are a considerable number of logics that do not seem to share the same inferential principles. Intuitionistic logics do not include the law of the exclude.

Adding a transparent truth predicate to a language completely governed by classical logic is not possible. The trouble, as is well-known, comes from paradoxes such as the Liar and Curry. Recently, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have put forward an approach based on a non-transitive notion of consequence which is suitable to deal with semantic paradoxes while having a transparent truth predicate together with classical logic. Nevertheless, there are some interesting issues concerning the set of metainferences validated by this (...) logic. In this paper, we show that this logic, once it is adequately understood, is weaker than classical logic. Moreover, the logic is in a way similar to the paraconsistent logic LP. (shrink)

In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Gödel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and not semantic. In Section (...) 2, we shall argue that Milne is still begging the question against Truthmaker Maximalism. In Section 3, we shall argue that even assimilating M to the Liar does not force the truthmaker maximalist to maintain the ‘dull option’ that M does not express a proposition. There are other options open and, though they imply revising the logic in Milne’s reasoning, this is not one of the possible revisions he considers. In Section 4, we shall suggest that Milne’s proof requires an implicit appeal to semantic principles and notions. In Section 5, we shall point out that there are two important dissimilarities between M and the Gödel sentence. Section 6 is a brief summary and conclusion. (shrink)

En este artículo, me propongo exponer algunas dificultades relacionadas con la posibilidad de que la Teoría de Modelos pueda constituirse en una Teoría General de la Interpretación. Específicamente la idea que sostengo es que lo que nos muestra la Paradoja de Orayen es que las interpretaciones no pueden ser ni conjuntos ni objetos. Por eso, una elucidación del concepto intuitivo de interpretación, que apele a este tipo de entidades, está condenada al fracaso. De manera secundaria, muestro que no hay algún (...) supuesto conjuntista que sea imprescindible para que surja la mencionada paradoja: sólo se necesita que las interpretaciones sean objetos. Voy a argumentar que si las interpretaciones son objetos, tal como lo supone la posibilidad de cuantificar sobre las mismas para poder dar una caracterización satisfactoria de consecuencia lógica, la au-toaplicación (como un caso de aplicación de los recursos semánticos de la teoría de modelos para encontrar una interpretación con máxima generalidad) es imposible. Finalmente, discuto cada una de las dos soluciones que el propio Orayen imaginó frente a su paradoja, y muestro que cada una posee diferentes dificultades.In this paper, I intend to present some problems to construe the Model Theory as a Theory of Interpretation. Specifically, I am going to defend that, according to the Paradox of Orayen, interpretations can not be neither set nor object. Thus, an explication of the intuitive concept of interpretation that appeals to these types of entities will be condemned to failure. Secondary, I will show that there is not any like-set assumption indispensable to get rise to that paradox: only all is needed is the assumption that interpretations are objects. I am going to argue that if interpretations are objects, as it is assumed by the possibility of quantifying over interpretations in order to offer an satisfactory characterization of logical consequence, self-application (as a case of application of semantics resources of the Model Theory for finding a interpretation with absolute generality) is not possible. Eventually, I will discuss both of the solutions provided by Orayen to his paradox and I will support that both have different difficulties. (shrink)

Belnap and Gupta have recently maintained that truth is a circular concept: its extension cannot be established without being previously hypothesized. This has led Yaqub to claim that the circular character in question cannot be made compatible with the thesis that semantic properties tlre supervenient ones. Belnap and Gupta have explicitly denied sitch a claim any plausibility. In this paper, I offir some new arguments in support of Yaqub 's position. Such arguments are based on an analysis of some aspects (...) of Belnap and Gupta's theory that, as for as I know, had not been considered before. (shrink)

Διαθέτουμε δύο αντίγραφα (το ένα του Μελετίου, το άλλο του Lyons) μιας επιγραφής από την Ήπειρο που είναι αναθηματική σε κάποιο ποταμό Ωρωπό. Η επιγραφή, χαμένη σή- μέρα, βρισκόταν στο ρωμαϊκό υδραγωγείο της Νικόπολης, στο ύψος του Αγίου Γεωργίου. Η πιο ενδιαφέρουσα διαφορά μεταξύ των δύο διατηρουμένων αντιγράφων εντοπίζεται στην ανάγνωση του υδρωνυμίου (Μελέτιος : ΩΡΟΡΟΝ, Lyons : ΩΡΩΠΩ). Συζητούνται οι διαφορές και προτείνεται μια νέα υπόθεση : τ]φ 'Ρωγών ποταμω.

La verdad en cuanto ligada al lenguaje ha de ser concebida simultáneamente como coherencia y como correspondencia. Pero la palabra es siempre, a la vez, impotencia y fuerza creadora. Ahí es donde se sitúa realmente el tema de la verdad. La razón nos sitúa ante la responsabilidad de un proyecto y unos fines. La ciencia nos acerca a la verdad de lo que es la realidad en cuanto "acción racional de la razón practica". Se trata de un proceso de "empastamiento" (...) o progresiva coherencia, que no llega nunca a "tocar" la realidad. Hay una relación dialéctica entre nuestro juicio y la realidad. nuestra imputación de realidad se nos convierte en un "juicio de verdad" hermenéuticamente desvelada. (shrink)

Self-enhancement is the biasing of one’s view of oneself in a positive direction. The brain correlates of self-enhancement remain unclear though it has been reported that the medial prefrontal cortex may be important for producing self-enhancing responses. Previous studies have not examined whether the neural correlates of self-enhancement depend on the particular domain in which individuals are enhancing themselves. Both moralistic and egoistic words were presented to participants while transcranial magnetic stimulation was applied to the MPFC, precuneus or in a (...) sham orientation. Participants were asked to make decisions as to the words describing themselves, some of which were positive and some of which were negative. It was found the MPFC TMS significantly disrupted egoistic self-enhancement when TMS was delivered to the MPFC. Judgments involving moralistic words were not influenced by TMS. These data provide further evidence that MPFC is involved in self-enhancement, and that the role of MPFC may be selective in this regard. (shrink)

Recently, it has been proposed to understand a logic as containing not only a validity canon for inferences but also a validity canon for metainferences of any finite level. Then, it has been shown that it is possible to construct infinite hierarchies of ‘increasingly classical’ logics—that is, logics that are classical at the level of inferences and of increasingly higher metainferences—all of which admit a transparent truth predicate. In this paper, we extend this line of investigation by taking a somehow (...) different route. We explore logics that are different from classical logic at the level of inferences, but recover some important aspects of classical logic at every metainferential level. We dub such systems meta-classical non-classical logics. We argue that the systems presented deserve to be regarded as logics in their own right and, moreover, are potentially useful for the non-classical logician. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} (...) \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-based hierarchy, of which LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document} and ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document}, ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} and the logics of the ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains? From an anti-exceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-metainferential logics in general—and STTω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {STT}}_{\omega }$$\end{document} in particular—are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that (...) in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth. (shrink)

The accuracy of proxies when they interpret advance directives or apply substituted decision-making criteria has been called into question. It therefore became important to know if the Andalusian Advance Directive Form (AADF) can help to increase the accuracy of proxies' predictions. The aim of this research was to compare the effect of the AADF on the accuracy of proxies' predictions about patients' preferences with that gained from informative and deliberative sessions about end-of-life decision making. A total of 171 pairs of (...) patients and their proxies were randomized to three groups. The control group's answers to the Life Sustaining Preferences Questionnaire (LSPQ) were compared with their proxies' answers to the same questionnaire. In one intervention group, the patients had already completed the AADF and given it to their proxies, who used it to guide their own answers to the LSPQ. In the second intervention (discussion) group, both patients and proxies attended two educative sessions guided by trained nurses and later filled in the LSPQ. Comparisons of accuracy and other variables showed a strong association with the discussion group. The findings show that promoting communication between patients and their proxies improves the accuracy of proxies' predictions much more than isolated use of the AADF form. (shrink)

El contenido de la presente discusión de Análisis Filosófico surge a partir de diversas actividades organizadas por mí en SADAF y en la UBA. En primer lugar, Roy Cook dictó en SADAF el seminario de investigación intensivo On Yablo's Paradox durante la última semana de julio de 2011. En el seminario, el profesor Cook presentó el manuscrito aún sin finalizar de su libro The Yablo Paradox: An Essay on Circularity, Oxford, Oxford UP, (en prensa). Extensas y apasionantes discusiones ocurrieron durante (...) esos encuentros sobre circularidad y construcciones infinitarias. Fue en ese tiempo, donde me surgió la idea de editar una discusión sobre las ideas que Cook defiende en ese trabajo. El proyecto era una extensión natural del trabajo que veníamos realizando con mi grupo de investigación en temas vinculados al concepto de verdad, autorreferencia y paradojas. Luego, durante el segundo cuatrimestre de 2011, dicté el seminario La paradoja de Yablo, en el instituto de filosofía de la UBA. Algunos de los borradores de los artículos que aparecen en el presente volumen tienen su origen en este curso. Finalmente, invité por segunda vez al profesor Cook al Symposium on Yablo's Paradox realizado en SADAF en julio de 2012. En esta oportunidad, se presentaron las versiones finales de los artículos de Lavinia Picollo, Paula Teijeiro, Federico Pailos, Diego Tajer, Lucas Rosenblatt e Ignacio Ojea que se incluyen a continuación. El encuentro incluyó las inteligentes réplicas del profesor Cook y profundas discusiones sobre los mencionados temas lógicosemánticos. Quiero agradecer a todos los integrantes del Gaf[log] que participaron activamente en las mencionadas actividades, ya sea en la publicación posterior o en los coloquios y seminarios que le dieron origen. Agradezco al Comité editorial de Análisis Filosófico, en especial a Alberto Moretti, quienes apoyaron desde sus comienzos este proyecto. Finalmente, y de manera especial, quiero expresar mi gratitud al profesor Roy Cook, quien no sólo apoyó e inspiró el proyecto desde sus comienzos, sino que además compartió generosamente sus ideas y las discutió con estimulante pasión. (shrink)

Many authors have considered that the notions of paraconsistency and dialetheism are intrinsically connected, in many cases, to the extent of confusing both phenomena. However, paraconsistency is a formal feature of some logics that consists in invalidating the rule of explosion, whereas dialetheism is a semantical/ontological position consisting in accepting true contradictions. In this paper, we argue against this connection and show that it is perfectly possible to adopt a paraconsistent logic and reject dialetheism, and, moreover, that there are examples (...) of non-paraconsistent logics that can be interpreted in a dialetheic way. (shrink)

A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth (...) based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT. (shrink)

According to Etchemendy, in attempting to offer an analysis of the modal features of the intuitive concept of logical consequence, Tarski has committed a modal fallacy. In this paper, I consider the thesis according to it is posible to analyze the modals properties of concept of logical consequence through of a generalization on set-theoretical interpretations. As is known, some philosophers have tried to argue for the transit from the general to the modal by showing that there are enough settheoretic interpretations (...) so as to be able to represent the modal features of the intuitive concept of consequence. As is also known, those people have encountered a lot of difficulties. In the present paper, I will try to show that those problems are related not with the specific possibility of accounting for the modal features by means of a set-theoretic notion of model but with the possibility of coming up with a precise mathematical theory for the concept of interpretation, and, as such, they can be solved by way of appealing to the usual solutions to this problem. (shrink)